School Competition and Teacher Labor Markets: Evidence from Charter School Entry in North Carolina by C. Kirabo Jackson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SCHOOL COMPETITION AND TEACHER LABOR MARKETS:








I would like to thank Kara Bonneau for help in obtaining data from the North Carolina Education Research
Data Center, and David Figlio, Mark Steinmeyer,  and Diane Schanzenbach  for valuable comments.
I am particularly grateful to James Cowan for excellent research assistance. Funding for this research
was provided by the Smith Richardson Foundation. All errors are my own. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by C. Kirabo Jackson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.School Competition and Teacher Labor Markets: Evidence from Charter School Entry in North
Carolina
C. Kirabo Jackson




I analyze changes in teacher turnover, hiring, effectiveness, and salaries at traditional public schools
after the opening of a nearby charter school. While I find small effects on turnover overall, difficult
to staff schools (low-income, high-minority share) hired fewer new teachers and experienced small
declines in teacher quality. I also find evidence of a demand side response where schools increased
teacher compensation to better retain quality teachers. The results are robust across a variety of alternate
specifications to account for non-random charter entry.
C. Kirabo Jackson
Northwestern University






School Competition and Teacher Labor Markets: 
Evidence from Charter School Entry in North Carolina 
 
C. Kirabo Jackson 
Northwestern University & IPR & NBER 
 
I analyze changes in teacher turnover, hiring, effectiveness, and salaries at traditional public schools after the 
opening of a nearby charter school. While I find small effects on turnover overall, difficult to staff schools (low-
income, high-minority share) hired fewer new teachers and experienced small declines in teacher quality. I also find 
evidence of a demand side response where schools increased teacher compensation to better retain quality teachers. 
The results are robust across a variety of alternate specifications to account for non-random charter entry.  
 
 
  Increasing school competition is seen as one way to improve students’ outcomes.  Many 
school reforms such as school vouchers, school choice, and charter schools, are predicated, in 
part, on the notion that increased competitive pressures cause schools to use their scarce 
resources more efficiently (Friedman 1955, 1997). However, opponents of school competition 
argue that such policies deprive existing schools of much needed resources, and may lead to 
cream skimming of good students, and good teachers from already underperforming schools.
1 
Adding fuel to this debate, the empirical evidence on the effect of increased competition on 
students at pre-existing Traditional Public Schools (TPSs) is decidedly mixed.
2  
  One of the hypothesized mechanisms through which increased competition could affect 
student outcomes is by changing the distribution of teachers across schools. Recent evidence 
suggests that there are large differences in teacher quality, and these differences translate into 
substantial differences in student achievement (Hanushek et. al. 2005, Rockoff 2004, Aaronson, 
Barrow and Sander 2007). Hence, given mixed evidence on how school competition affects 
student achievement in TPSs, and the push to increase competition in public education by 
                                                 
1There is an important but subtle distinction between school competition in the Tiebout sense between multiple 
public education providers who are subject to the same rules and personnel practices, and the increased competitive 
pressure caused by recent policies such as charter schools, alternative schools, and vouchers that introduce different 
kinds of schools to compete with traditional public school that may have different personnel practices and be subject 
to different rules and restrictions. While the two are related, this paper speaks to the later. 
2 Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (2007) analyze the competition provided by multiple public school districts in the 
same metropolitan area and come to different conclusions; Dee (1998) finds positive effects of competition provided 
by Catholic schools; Looking at the effect of charter school entry on traditional public school students studies find 
negative effects (Imberman 2011), no effect (Bettinger 2005; Bifulco and Ladd 2006), and small positive effects 
(Sass 2006). As such, how increased school competition affects student outcomes at traditional schools is still an 




3, it is important to understand the role of teachers.  
  The effect that increased school competition would have on teachers at pre-existing TPSs 
is theoretically ambiguous. On the supply side, TPSs that face increased competition may 
experience difficulties attracting and retaining good teachers. However, on the demand side, 
because funding is tied to student enrolment, TPSs that face competition for students have an 
increased incentive to hire and keep teachers who help attract students (Hoxby 2002). Because 
supply and demand factors move in opposite directions, the net effect on teacher quality and 
teacher turnover in TPSs is ambiguous, and small effects on turnover or teacher quality do not 
imply a lack of competitive pressure. That is, because schools may respond to the threat of 
teachers leaving by paying higher salaries, competitive pressure could be reflected in higher 
salaries rather than teacher turnover or quality. Also, because schools constantly have to hire new 
teachers due to high teacher turnover, competitive supply-side pressure may be reflected in 
reduced hiring rather than increased turnover. As such, one should look at the effects on various 
measures of labor quantity (turnover, new hires, quality), in addition to teacher salaries. 
  The existing research on competition and teachers relies on comparisons across 
geographic areas and finds that increased competitive pressure is associated with schools valuing 
teacher effort, the quality of teachers' college education, and teachers' math and science skills 
(Hoxby 2002), higher teacher quality (Hanushek and Rivkin 2003), and higher public school 
teacher salaries (Vedder and Hall 2000). Given the limitations of cross-sectional analyses, these 
studies may not provide direct evidence on how competition affects the quality of, or salaries 
paid to, teachers at incumbent TPSs. Moreover, these studies do not simultaneously look at 
quality, new hires, turnover, and salaries, which may be necessary for a complete description of 
the impact of school competition on teachers in TPSs. Another literature compares charter 
teachers to TPS teachers to assess whether competing charter schools attract good teachers from 
TPSs (Podgursky and Ballou 2001, Burian-Fitzgerald and Harris 2004, Baker and Dickerson 
2006, Caruthers 2009). While informative, these studies do not show how school competition 
affects teachers in TPSs because teachers who transfer to charter schools from TPSs may have 
                                                 
3 For example, President Obama stated that "many of the innovations in education today are happening in charter 
schools", and suggested that charter schools should be expanded [source: speech given to the Council of Chief State 
School officers, March 10, 2009, Washington D.C.]. Also, secretary of Education Arne Duncan is stated that "States 
that do not have public charter laws or put artificial caps on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their 
applications under the Race to the Top Fund." [source: U.S. Dept of Education press release June 8, 2009, States 
Open to Charters Start Fast in 'Race to Top'] 3 
 
left these schools absent charter competition. To understand how school competition affects the 
market for TPS teachers, it would be instructive to observe how teacher markets respond to 
charter school entry in the surrounding area.  
  I provide fresh evidence on how school competition affects teachers in TPSs by looking 
at a variety of outcomes to more completely characterize the teacher labor market and use the 
entry of a nearby charter school as an arguably exogenous increase in school competition. 
Specifically, I test whether charter school entry affects (a) the likelihood that a TPS teacher 
leaves her school, (b) the quality of teachers in incumbent schools, (c) the number of newly hired 
teachers at incumbent schools, and (d) the wages paid to traditional public school teachers.  
  I use two measures of teacher quality; the first is an index of teacher quality or predicted 
value-added based on observable teacher characteristics that can be created for all teachers; the 
second is estimated value-added that is available only for the sub-sample of 3rd through 5th 
grade teachers who had been in North Carolina public schools for a long period of time.  
  To identify the effect of charter competition, I employ a Difference in Differences 
strategy ─ comparing the change in outcomes within schools after charter entry to the change in 
outcomes within schools that face no changes in charter entry over the same time period. This 
strategy relies on variation in timing of charter entry. While this within-school approach removes 
much bias, because timing of charter entry is non-random, I show that (1) the main findings are 
robust to including school-specific linear trends, (2) the findings are robust to using interrupted 
panel data techniques, and (3) I present visual evidence that changes in outcomes occur after 
charter entry. I am reasonably confident the estimates can be interpreted causally.     
  On average, teachers who leave TPSs for charter schools have worse observable 
characteristics and value-added than those who remain. While more teachers leave for charter 
schools after the opening of a nearby charter (a mechanical effect), charter entry is not associated 
with an increase in teachers leaving TPSs overall ─ implying that those teachers who left for 
charter schools would have left the TPSs absent charter entry. While I find no effect on teacher 
quality, nearby charter entry is associated with increases in teacher compensation and reductions 
in the number of newly teacher hires ─ suggestive of (a) a demand response of incumbent 
schools to retain teachers, and (b) a supply effect making it harder to attract new teachers.  
  To further test that the effects are driven by increased competitive pressure, I look to see 
if the marginal effects are larger at "difficult to staff" schools (schools with high minority and 4 
 
low-income student shares) where teachers would be most responsive to alternate teaching 
opportunities. I find that the increases in teacher compensation and the reductions in new teacher 
hiring are much more pronounced in these difficult to staff schools, and I find evidence of 
declines in teacher quality ─ indicating that charter entry could lead to unfilled teacher 
vacancies, lower quality instruction, and less expenditure on non-teacher inputs (because 
increased teacher pay must come at the expense of other spending) at "difficult to staff" schools.  
  This is one of the first papers to investigate how arguably exogenous variation in school 
competition affects a variety of teacher labor market outcomes. The media often cites skimming 
away quality teachers from TPSs as one way charters either produce gains for their own students 
or hurt students in TPSs.
4 This research advances this argument by providing evidence on how 
charter schools affect the labor market for teachers within the existing TPS system, and shows 
that spillovers from the teacher market could affect other resources.  
  The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section I presents a theoretical framework. 
Section II describes charters in North Carolina and details the characteristics of teachers who 
move from TPSs to charter schools. Section III describes the identification strategy. Section IV 
presents the results, and section V concludes. 
 
I. Theoretical  Framework   
  Charter school competition may affect teacher labor markets both through the decisions 
of teachers (supply-side) and through the decisions of school administrators (demand-side). I 
discuss these mechanisms below. 
Supply Side Effects Only: On the supply side, increased school competition could affect teacher 
characteristics in traditional public schools through several channels. First, charter entry may 
cause increased attrition from nearby incumbent schools, forcing public schools to rely more 
heavily on new, inexperienced teachers. Second, if charter schools demand different kinds of 
teachers than TPSs, charter schools’ preferences for teachers may alter the composition of 
teachers leaving incumbent schools.
5 Finally, because a greater number of schools in a given 
                                                 
4 Media stories often suggest charter schools attract teachers by offering good students and facilities [see, e.g., Fallis 
and Keating (2008), Keating and Labbe-DeBose (2008)]. One charter school recently founded in New York City, for 
instance, is founded on the premise of attracting quality teachers with high salaries (Gootman 2008). 
5 Podgursky and Ballou (2001) present survey evidence that charter schools are more willing to hire teachers with 
less experience and fewer official credentials. The improved job prospects for these teachers may cause more of 
them to leave traditional public schools. 5 
 
geographic area makes it harder to attract talented teachers to any individual school, charter 
competition may reduce the quantity and quality of new teachers applying for positions at TPSs. 
  The notion that teachers at schools close to newly entering charter schools would be 
affected by charter entry requires that teacher labor markets are localized. Martin (2000) 
observes that workers generally frequently exhibit a strong attachment to place resulting in the 
“spatial fixity” of local labor. Also, Gregory and Borland (1999) and Murnane and Steele (2007) 
argue that markets for teachers reflect restricted geographic scope. Consistent with this about 
sixty percent of new teachers in California begin teaching in the same county where they were 
employed before teaching (Barbour, Reed and Rubin 2006). Also first year teachers in New York 
state are twice as likely to teach within five miles of her hometown as 20 miles away. Consistent 
with this, in 1996 two-thirds of all teacher switching in NC occurred within the same district.
  The localized nature of teacher labor supply means that the wage elasticity of labor 
supply for a school is positive so that each school faces an upward sloping teacher labor supply 
curve. The degree to which charter entry will affect labor supply for a particular TPS depends on 
(a) the number of teachers hired at the charter school and (b) the proximity of the opening school 
to the public school. Because one third of charter teachers came from TPSs (Caruthers 2010) and 
teachers have strong preferences for proximity, while charter entry may have small effects in the 
aggregate, it could have large effects on the labor supply to nearby TPSs.  
  Figure 1 illustrates this graphically. The left side shows the number of teachers hired at a 
local charter school, and the right shows the associated change in teacher supply for nearby 
TPSs. I assume that teachers only work at schools located in their “teacher supply area” so that 
labor supply within a teacher supply area is depicted by the curve S0. When a charter enters it 
hires Lcharter teachers. Because of the limited geography of the “teacher supply area” some of 
these teachers would have worked at the nearby TPSs but now no longer do so. This reduces 
labor supply for the nearby public schools as depicted by a shift in labor supply from S0 to S1. 
  How this entry will affect employment depends on the ability of individual schools to 
adjust wages. In a rigid wage regime, wages are set to Wu irrespective of the number of teachers 
required. The number of teachers hired will be where Wu intersects with the new labor supply so 
that TPS employment falls from L0 to L1 (fewer teachers are now willing to work at the 
traditional public schools at the pre-entry wage). There would be no change in teacher 
compensation, increases in teacher turnover, and reductions in the number of new teachers hired.  6 
 
If schools have some flexibility to pay some teacher higher wages then the wage regime 
would be similar to having a downward sloping labor demand curve (this may not necessarily 
reflect depict the marginal revenue product of labor). Schools in NC do have some ability to 
affect teacher compensation. While all certified NC educators working in Local Education 
Agencies (LEA) are required to be paid from the legislated salary schedule that sets a minimum 
pay based on the educators years of experience and education level, a supplement  to these 
monthly amounts can be approved to account for variances such as geographic location, market 
conditions or school demographics. Also, school principals can (and do) create compensation 
differences across teachers without altering their base pay by creating mentor teacher positions, 
training positions, administrative positions, coaching positions, extra teaching time, and summer 
teaching that carry additional salary. As such, while somewhat limited, principals do have the 
ability to affect teacher compensation so that the "labor demand" curve is not horizontal. 
  As depicted in Figure 1, with wage flexibility (and a downward sloping labor demand 
curve DFlexible), charter entry would lead to an increase in wages (from Wu to W1) which in turn 
would result in a smaller reduction in teachers employed from L0 to L2 . With flexible wages 
there is an increase in teacher wages, and increases in teacher turnover and reductions in new 
teacher hiring that are smaller than the changes one would observe under rigid wages. 
Both Supply Side and Demand -Side Effects: On the demand side, because schools operate like 
local monopolies, school competition could affect the incentives of public school administrators. 
Specifically, because quality teachers may attract students and funding is on a per-student basis, 
when students "vote with their feet" schools may work harder to attract and retain teachers that 
parents prefer (Friedman 1955, 1997; Hoxby 2002). If parents know which teachers are effective, 
public schools facing charter competition should be more (less) willing to hire and retain 
teachers with characteristics that are (not) known to be associated with improved student 
outcomes. Schools would do this by offering higher salaries to, or improving the non-pecuniary 
job characteristics of desirable teachers. Similarly, if parents dislike teacher turnover in general, 
the increased ability of students to flee the TPSs after a nearby charter opens would increase the 
marginal benefit of retaining all teachers (avoiding increased turnover) so that schools may wish 
to increase pay for teachers of all quality. 
  As depicted in Figure 2, where schools have a demand response and have wage 
flexibility, charter entry will lead to a shift in the labor demand curve from D0,Flexible to D1,Flexible. 7 
 
Now, even though supply side pressure would lead to a reduction in supply or quality teachers to 
TPSs and demand side factors should lead to an increase in demand for teachers, both supply and 
demand shifts cause upward pressure on teacher wages in TPSs. These offsetting effects may 
cause competitive pressure to manifest itself into no change (and possibly even an increase) in 
teacher quality or quantity, but would lead to an increase in teacher salaries from W0 to W2. With 
flexible wages and an off-setting demand side response, increases in wages will be larger than 
that with no demand side response. Also, changes in teacher turnover and new hires would be 
smaller (and possibly opposite in sign) than those with no demand side response. While I cannot 
disaggregate the overall changes into supply- and demand-side effects, I can test for the presence 
of competitive pressure by seeing if there is an effect on teacher salaries, and can assess whether  
demand-side or supply-side pressures dominate overall. 
 
II.   Charter Schools and Teachers in North Carolina and the Data. 
  The North Carolina legislature ratified a law allowing charter schools in 1996, and the 
first charters opened a year later (N. Car. Gen. St., 115C-238.29). As in many states, charter 
schools in North Carolina are managed by an independent board under a chartering contract with 
a LEA or university; however, they receive public funding based on the number of enrolled 
students. While some charters can be obtained by a local LEA or the state, in North Carolina 
none of the charters are sponsored by the state and are all managed by independent boards.
6 The 
public funding received by charter schools would otherwise be earmarked for the school district 
in which the student resides. Charter schools are given greater flexibility in management than 
traditional public schools. They are subject to state testing and other requirements, but exempt 
from many state laws regulating personnel and operations. Notably, charter schools in NC are 
partially exempt from regulations requiring state certification of public school teachers.
7  
Table 1 gives information on charter entry and teacher movement to charter schools 
during the time period covered in this study. The law capped the total number of charter schools 
                                                 
6 This is based on conversations with the officials at the office of charter schools at the state board of education on June 2, 2011. 
During these conversations I was told that the relationship between charter schools and the surrounding TPS are generally 
contentious ─ suggesting that North Carolina is a good context to study charter competition. 
7 The law authorizing charter schools stipulates that 75% of elementary and middle school teachers and 50% of 
junior and senior high school teachers be state licensed. The remainder of the faculty may be appointed as the school 
deems fit, provided they meet federal requirements. The North Carolina law is consistent with management practices 
of charter schools elsewhere. Podgursky and Ballou (2001) found that fewer than 20% of charter schools employed 
faculties with more than 50% unlicensed teachers.  8 
 
at 100, and by 2005, 99 charters were operating statewide. The data in this study come from 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction administrative records maintained by the North 
Carolina Education Research Data Center. The records contain detailed professional and 
demographic information on all teachers active in North Carolina public schools from 1995 
through 2006.  In addition, the data contains test scores for all public school students state-wide. 
  The turnover statistics in Table 1 come from comparing the school assignments of 
teachers in consecutive years. Teachers who change school assignments or leave the data at the 
end of the school year are coded as exiting their school.
8 While many teachers leave their TPS 
every year (about 17 percent in 1997) a small fraction of them leave for charter schools (about 
0.1 percent). Since the effect of charter school entry is likely to be localized to areas close to 
charter schools I compute the fraction of TPS teachers at schools within 2 miles, between 2 and 
10 miles, and between 10 and 20 miles of a charter school, who exit for charters. In 1997, the 
year with the greatest charter entry, 0.8 percent of teachers at schools within 2 miles of a charter 
school exited to a charter school. This percentage drops sharply beyond 2 miles such that only 
0.2 percent of teachers at schools between 2 and 10 miles of a charter school exited to a charter 
school (not much more than the average for all schools in North Carolina of 0.1 percent). This is 
consistent with localized teacher labor markets effect. As argued above, the relatively low 
proportion of teachers who move from TPSs to charters does not mean that charter schools have 
no effect on the labor market for TPS teachers because it could reflect offsetting demand and 
supply effects. To assess the nature of competitive pressure on the teacher labor market, one 
must look at turnover, the characteristics of new hires and teacher salaries as I do in section IV.  
Table 2 documents the characteristics of public schools, charter schools, and the public 
schools located near charter schools using data on neighborhood characteristics from the 2000 
Census and enrollment information from the Common Core of Data (years 1995 through 2006). 
Charter schools in North Carolina are more likely than TPSs to be located in cities; however, 
more than 30% of charters are located in small towns or rural areas. About 53 percent of charter 
schools are in a large or medium sized city compared to 45% for TPSs in NC as a whole. 
Consistent with charter schools being located in more urban settings, the average proportion of 
white and black residents in charter neighborhoods are 66 percent and 27 percent, respectively, 
                                                 
8 Many teachers take one- or two-year leaves of absence during the sample period. These teachers are not coded as 
exiting provided they return to their original school. 9 
 
compared to 71 percent and 23 percent, respectively, for the state as a whole.  
Schools close to charter schools differ from those that are farther away and do not face 
charter competition. Schools within 2 miles of a charter school are more likely to be in an urban 
neighborhood (74 percent) than schools between 2 and 10 miles from a charter (60 percent) and 
those between 10 and 20 miles from a charter (24 percent). These differences highlight the 
importance of looking at changes within schools as opposed to comparing schools that are close 
to charter schools to those that are not. There are also important differences by the ethnic and 
socioeconomic composition of the neighborhoods. Schools within 2 miles of a charter school are 
in areas with more black residents (30.6 percent) than schools between 2 and 10 miles from a 
charter (22.4 percent) and those between 10 and 20 miles from a charter (17.5 percent).  Also, 
schools within 2 miles of a charter school are in areas with median incomes of $38,820, while 
schools between 2 and 10 miles from a charter have median incomes of $41,787 and those 
between 10 and 20 miles from a charter have median incomes of $39,012.  
Because teachers care about workplace conditions when deciding where to work, it is 
helpful to describe how charter schools differ from TPSs. While charter schools may be located 
in areas where there are other schools, because charter enrollment is voluntary, charter schools 
often do not enroll students typical of those at surrounding schools. For example, the average 
charter school enrolls 50.9% white students, compared to 59.7% white in all North Carolina 
public schools and 46.1% in public schools within a 2-mile radius of a charter school. Charter 
schools are also less likely to enroll low-income students, as measured by free-lunch eligibility, 
than other public schools. The average charter school has 14.1% free-lunch eligibility, compared 
to 36.6% for all North Carolina public schools and 42.3% for public schools within 2 miles of a 
charter. It is worth noting that while charter schools have smaller enrollments (207 students at 
charters compared to 610 for the state and 594 for schools within 2 miles of a charter) the student 
teacher ratios at charter schools are similar to those schools within 2 miles, but lower than 
schools more than 2 miles away. The summary statistics suggest that charter schools may 
provide an easier working environment than those at public schools near to charters. Consistent 
with this notion, in a state-wide survey from 2002, charter teachers in NC were more likely to 
strongly agree that "Teachers are centrally involved in decision making", "Teachers are 
recognized as experts", "There is an atmosphere of mutual respect at school", "leadership tries to 
address concerns about time", and that "Teachers have reasonable student loads". These survey 10 
 
results (in appendix Table 1) and summary statistics suggest that charter schools may be an 
attractive alternative for teachers teaching in, or considering a teaching job, at a TPS. 
II.1   The Teacher Data  
Because this study is focused on teachers in TPSs, I only require data on TPS teachers. 
However, it may be informative to discuss the characteristics of charter school teachers. While I 
do not have data on the entire universe of charter school teachers, Burian-Fitzgerald and Harris 
(2004) analyze the differences between charter school teachers and public school teachers by 
state using the NCES Schools and Staffing Survey for 1999-2000. They found that charter school 
teachers in NC were less experienced and less likely to hold a teaching certificate, but more 
likely to have graduated from a selective college. Given that over 40 percent of charter teachers 
came from TPSs, one might infer that these are the types of teachers that leave TPSs for charters. 
I formally assess this in Section II.3. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of public school teachers and those moving from 
TPSs to charter schools. The data include several characteristics including years of experience, 
state teaching licensure, possession of an advanced degree, National Board Certification, the 75
th 
percentile SAT math score of the teacher’s undergraduate institution, and teacher's Praxis 
scores.
9 I also look at measures of unobserved teacher quality. I discuss these below. 
II.2   Measures of Teacher Quality  
Predicted Value-Added: The first measure of teacher quality, that can be computed for all 
teachers including newly hired teachers, is predicted teacher effectiveness. I obtain these by 
estimating an equation of student achievement with the inclusion of observable teacher 
characteristics (such as scores on the Praxis exams, certification etc.) on students in grades 3 
through 5 for the years 1995 through 2006. Specifically I estimate [1] below. 
11 12 ' 1 1 3 4 5 6 ijgt ijg t i jg t i st jt j t g jt ijgt AA A X Z W W                         [1] 
In [1]  ijgt A is the achievement score of student i with teacher j in grade g in year t,  '1 1 ij g t A  are the 
average incoming test scores of a student’s classmates,  i X  is a vector of student characteristics 
such as ethnicity, gender and parental education level.  jt W  is a vector including teacher 
experience and class-size,  st Z is a vector of school attributes including the percent black, percent 
                                                 
9 Certification involves assessment of a teacher’s classroom practices and content knowledge. The Praxis score  is an 
average from a battery of standardized tests administered as part of the teacher licensing process. 11 
 
white, percent Hispanic, the percent free-lunch eligible students and the urbanicity of the school, 
j W  is a vector of observable teacher characteristics,  t  is a year fixed effect,  g   is a grade fixed 
effect,  jt  is a classroom level error term and  ijgt   is the idiosyncratic student level error term. 
  Using estimates from equation [1], I predict teacher effectiveness using the observable 
teacher characteristics. Specifically, the predicted value-added for teacher j is  6 ˆ j W   (i.e. the 
predicted value-added associated with teacher j's experience, certification, licensure test scores, 
college SAT scores, and advanced degree status). This measure serves as a useful summary 
statistic for all of the observable teacher characteristics. It is a weighted average of a teacher’s 
observable characteristics, where the weights are determined by the characteristics' relationship 
with actual student achievement. The benefit of this measure is that it can be computed for all 
teachers irrespective of when they enter the data. Unfortunately, these measures are only defined 
for teachers in grades K through 5. As such, it is important to note that both the measures pertain 
to teachers in elementary schools and not to teachers in middle schools and high schools.
10 
Estimated Value-Added: As the second measure I use a teacher’s estimated value-added, 
estimated in an out-of-sample pre-period, as a characteristic.
11 Specifically, to identify effective 
teachers, I estimate teacher fixed-effects in a test score growth model of the form [2] using data 
on students in grades 3 through 5 for the years 1995 through 1998. 
'1 1 11 12 3 4 5 () ij g t ijgt ijg t i st jt g j jt ijgt AA A X Z W                    [2] 
All variables are defined as before. There are no observable teacher characteristics included, and 
j   is a teacher fixed effect. Following Kane and Staiger (2008), I decompose the error term
( j  jt ijgt) to create Empirical Bayes (EB) estimates of the teacher value-added.
12 To allow 
for estimates that are comparable across schools and grades, I do not include school or student 
fixed-effects but rather include a set of demographic controls for the students and schools.
13    
                                                 
10 Elementary schools make up 60 percent of all schools in North Carolina, so that this is a relevant population. 
11 While there are several specifications used in the literature to estimate teacher value-added, effects across studies 
are surprisingly robust to the chosen specification (Kane and Staiger 2008). For a detailed discussion of the 
theoretical and econometric assumptions underlying value-added specifications see Todd and Wolpin (2003).   
12 See appendix note 1 for details of how I compute the Empirical Baye's estimates. 
13 Specifications that include student or school fixed-effects identify teacher value-added based on within-school or 
within-student variation. If teachers are very different across schools, then much of the variation in teacher quality 
(i.e. the cross-school variation) will be absorbed by the school fixed-effect, making estimated effects across schools 
impossible to compare. Including student fixed-effects further exacerbates this problem by only allowing 
comparisons of teachers who teach the same groups of students. If those teachers who teach the gifted and talented 12 
 
    To avoid endogeneity between charter entry and estimated value-added, when I analyze 
estimated value added, I exclude charter entry prior to 1998.
14 One worry is that because the 
estimates are obtained only for teachers who are in the data prior to 1998, many teachers do not 
have estimated value added by 2006. Because about one quarter of teachers have estimated 
value-added in the analytical sample the estimates are sensitive to how missing data are treated. 
To bound the effects I present estimates that impute the 90th and 10th percentile of the value-
added distribution for teachers with no estimate. Also, because actual estimates are available for 
a minority of teachers, I rely more heavily on predicted value-added (above) as an outcome.  
II.3   Do Charter School Movers Differ From Those Who remain in TPSs? 
  Since charter schools locate near traditional public schools that differ in important ways 
from the average school, there is no reason to expect that the teachers they attract will be 
representative of the state as a whole. To see how charter school movers compare to potential 
charter school applicants, I compare charter movers to the teachers at the schools they leave. To 
conduct this descriptive analysis, I estimate the following model by OLS. 
  12 it it ijt it jt ijt Y charter Exit Switch               [ 3 ]  
In [3] Yijt is a characteristic of teacher i at school j in year t, exitit is an indicator for whether 
teacher i leaves her current school at the end of academic year t, switchit is an indicator for 
whether the teacher moves to another North Carolina school in year t+1, charterit is an indicator 
for whether the teacher moves to a charter in year t+1, and θjt is a school-by-year fixed effect. 
The inclusion of a school-by-year fixed effect ensures that I compare teachers who leave for 
charter schools to teachers who worked at the same traditional public school in the previous year 
who did not switch to a charter school. The coefficients β, δ1, and δ2 estimate how departing 
teachers differ from the mean characteristics within a school-year cell. The sum of these 
coefficients,  β+δ1+δ2, yields the difference in the characteristic between teachers moving to 
charter schools and teachers who did not leave their former schools during the year they left.  
  In Panel B of Table 4, compared to teachers at their previous schools, charter school 
movers have worse-than-average characteristics. The only characteristic in which charter school 
                                                                                                                                                             
students are of different average quality than those who teach the regular students, the estimated teacher value-added 
can only be used to compare teachers who share the same students so that comparing teachers who teach different 
students (even within the same school) may be misguided. 
14 Note that Jackson (2010) find that the teacher effectiveness if typically lower before a move to another school 
than after. As such theses estimated value-added may not perfectly represent long-run teacher effectiveness. 13 
 
movers appear better qualified than the average teacher at their former schools is mean Praxis 
score; however, this difference is not statistically significant from zero. The biggest differences 
between charter school movers and teachers at their old schools are in license status and 
experience. Charter school movers are 20.7% less likely to hold a state license and have 4.76 
years fewer experience than teachers at the schools they leave behind ─ consistent with the 
characteristics of NC charter school teachers documented in Table 3. Looking at the measures of 
overall teacher quality, charter movers have 0.02 of a standard deviation lower predicted math 
value-added based on observable characteristics and 0.1 of a standard deviation lower estimated 
math value-added (both are statistically significant at the 5 percent level). Looking to reading, 
charter movers have 0.015 (albeit not significant) of a standard deviation lower predicted value-
added based on observable characteristics and 0.014 of a standard deviation lower estimated 
value-added. A notable pattern is that teachers who leave for charters differ from teachers who 
leave TPSs for other TPSs. Both math and reading value-added (imputed and estimated) are 
lower for charter switchers than traditional school switchers.  
   These comparisons describe teachers who switch from TPSs to charter schools, but they 
do not tell us how charter competition affects teachers at TPSs because teachers who moved to 
charters may have left TPSs absent charter competition. In the next section I detail a strategy to 
uncover an estimate of the effect of charter competition on teacher quality. 
 
III. Empirical  Strategy 
The main obstacle to identifying the effect of charter entry is the non-random location of 
charter schools. Because charter schools locate near schools that differ from the average NC 
public school, a simple cross-school analysis is unlikely to yield a causal relationship. To avoid 
the bias that arises from non-random location decisions, I compare changes in outcomes within 
schools after an increase in charter competition to the change in outcomes within schools that 
face no changes in charter competition over the same time period. I implement this Difference in 
Difference (DID) strategy by estimating the following model by OLS.  
jt jt j t jt Yn e a r b y              [ 4 ]  
Yjt is the mean teacher characteristic at school j in year t,  δj is a school fixed effect, γt is a year 
fixed effect, and nearbyjt is a measure of charter school competition. nearbyjt is an indicator 
variable denoting whether a charter school exists serving at least one common grade within a 14 
 
certain radius of school j in year t.
15 Because it is not obvious ex ante what constitutes a "nearby" 
charter, I show estimates for having any charter school serving at least one common grade within 
2 miles, 10 miles, and 20 miles.
16 I use indicator variables for any nearby charter because most 
schools that face charter competition are only close to one charter. Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of the number of charters conditional on being close to any charter school for the 
three distance measures. Most of the variation in charter competition is between having zero and 
one nearby charter. In any case, results using the number of charters, or charter school 
enrolment, in a given area (not presented) are similar.   
  Because schools that face charter competition may differ in important unobserved ways 
from schools that do not, using all schools to form the counterfactual change in outcomes for 
schools that do face charter competition may be misguided. As such, I use as my sample only 
those schools that faced some charter competition during the sample period.
17   
  This DID strategy removes (a) time-invariant differences in teacher characteristics 
specific to individual schools, and (b) time specific shocks (such as state-wide policies) that 
affect all schools. Using the sample of schools that face some charter competition, identification 
is based solely on variation in the timing of charter entry. As such, the remaining endogeneity 
concern is that having a charter school nearby is coincident with changes in unobserved 
characteristics that may affect staffing. Because this is a serious concern, I deal with the 
possibility of endogenous timing in a variety of ways. First, I estimate models that also include 
school-specific linear time trends; second, following Hanushek et al. (2007) and Imberman 
(2011), I provide interrupted panel estimates that remove data from the two years immediately 
preceding an increase in charter penetration; and finally I present visual evidence that the 
changes in outcomes occur after charter entry. The main findings are robust to making these 
adjustments, so that the findings can plausibly be given a causal interpretation. 
  As a further check on the results, I look at a subsample of schools for which I expect the 
largest effects. I identify 215 schools that are both in the top quarter of ethnic minority 
enrollment and percent minority because these two characteristics are associated with difficulty 
                                                 
15 supporting this specification choice, while charter entry with at least one overlapping grade has statistically 
significant effects on outcomes, entry in non-overlapping grades has no effect. 
16 Bifulco and Ladd (2006) report that 89.7% of North Carolina charter student transfers come from a 10 mile radius 
of the schools. Loeb, Lankford and Wykoff show that teacher labor markets are very small so that the number of 
charter schools within 10 miles is likely the most relevant/appropriate measure of charter penetration.   
17 Note that using the full sample of schools makes little difference to the estimated results. 15 
 
retaining and attracting new teachers (Jackson 2009).
18 If the proposed mechanisms are truly at 
play, one would expect that the estimated effects would be the most pronounced in these difficult 
to staff schools. Because these schools are also where resources are needed the most, the 
potential effects on students at these schools are of interest in their own right.   
  
IV. Results 
  In this section I present visual evidence to complement the regression estimates. 
Specifically, for each outcome I run a regression with four leads and lags of the charter entry 
variable, school fixed effects, and year fixed effects. I plot the estimated evolution of outcomes 
before and after charter entry and I present these plots along with the regression results. 
IV.1  Effects on Moving to Charter Schools and Exiting 
  The top left panel of Figure 4 plots changes in the likelihood of exiting to a charter school 
before and after charter entry. Because charter schools did not exist before entry there must be a 
mechanical increase in teachers moving to a charter school after the entry of a charter school. 
Figure 4 shows that there is an increase in teachers moving to charter schools the year of charter 
entry within 2, 10, and 20 miles. The increase is most pronounced for charters within smaller 
distances ─ indicating that teachers tend to move to charters that are closest to their current 
school. A notable pattern is that while there is an initial increase in teachers moving to charters, 
this increase is short-lived so that the number of teachers moving to a charter school increases 
only slightly after about three years.  
  These patterns are consistent with the regression results. In the right panel of Table 5, I 
present coefficients on "nearby" charter for those within 2, 10 and 20 miles. The first row (school 
and year fixed effects) shows that having a charter within 2, 10, and 20 miles is associated with 
teachers being 0.15, 0.12, and 0.09 percentage points more likely to move to a charter school (all 
significant at the 1 percent level). To account for any pre-entry dip or spike in outcomes that 
might be associated with charter entry, in the second row I present interrupted panel estimates 
where data from the two years preceding charter entry are excluded. Such models yield point 
estimates that are very similar to those that include all years for the charter switching outcome. 
The third row presents interrupted panel estimates results while also including linear time trends 
                                                 
18 These schools are primarily located in urban areas and have disproportionately low levels of students 
achievement, so that any reasonable classification of difficult to staff schools yields a similar set of schools and 
similar results. 16 
 
for each school to account for the fact that schools may have been on a trajectory of improving or 
deteriorating outcomes before charter entry. Results from this conservative specification are 
similar to the baseline DID estimates and show that charter entry within 2, 10, or 20 miles is 
associated with about a 0.1 percentage point increase in teachers moving to charter schools. 
  The effects on charter moving do not show that teachers left because of charter entry, so 
that one must look at the likelihood that a teacher leaves her school more broadly. The top right 
of figure 4 shows the likelihood that a teacher leaves her current school the following year. For 2 
and 10 miles there appears to be a secular decline in teachers exiting the school, and little visual 
evidence of a change in exits associated with charter entry. For 20 miles the outcomes is 
relatively flat over time. This figure suggest that a failure to account for pre-existing trends may 
yield a spurious negative relationship between charter entry and teacher exits and that there is 
likely little or no causal relationship between charter entry and teacher exits. The regression 
results in Table 5 follow this pattern. For all distances, models that do not account for school 
trends show a negative relationship between charter entry and teacher exits, while models that 
account for trending and pre-entry spikes/dips in outcomes show that there is no systematic 
relationship between charter entry and teacher exits for schools on average. 
  Because I find that charter entry has virtually no effect of teacher exits on average, I now 
look to difficult to staff schools. Among difficult to staff schools, the point estimates suggest that 
there are little to no effects on teacher exits. The point estimates are positive for entry within two 
miles and negative for entry within 10 and 20 miles, and none of the estimates is significant at 
the 10 percent level. The lack of statistical significance and lack of robustness across models 
provide little evidence of increased turnover at difficult to staff schools. 
  While the theoretical framework suggests that the lack of any effect on teacher exit may 
be due to offsetting supply and demand shifts, readers may worry that the disruption in the 
teacher labor market from one additional charter is too small to affect teacher exits. To assess 
this, I focused on the 260 schools that saw more than one charter enter in one year. For these 
schools the point estimates are negative and statistically insignificant. I also look at the 18 
difficult to staff school that had more than one charter enter at any time. In this sample the point 
estimate is very close to zero and is not statistically significant. As such, the results suggest that 
charter entry was not associated with an increase in turnover so that (a) supply pressure was 
experienced in the form of less hiring or (b) there were offsetting demand forces at play, or both.  17 
 
IV.2  Effects on Salaries and New Hires 
  In this section I look at the effect of charter entry on teacher salaries and the number of 
newly hired teachers. To avoid confounding changes in the composition of teachers at schools 
with the salaries paid to teachers I use the residual of the log of teacher salaries after taking out a 
fixed effect for each group defined by year, experience, license type, certification status, and 
degree. To ensure that composition effects do not drive the findings I verify that results that use 
teacher-level data and include teacher-by-school fixed effects (i.e. looking at changes in salary 
for the same teacher within the same school before and after charter entry) yield similar results. 
  The middle left panel of Figure 4 shows how the residual of log teacher salaries change 
before and after charter entry. For schools that face entry within 2 miles there is a secular decline 
in teacher pay from before charter entry and little evidence of any deviation from trend after 
charter entry. In contrast, for the 10 mile and 20 mile samples, teacher salaries appear to increase 
(relative to a slight upward pre-entry trend) after charter entry within 10 and 20 miles. The effect 
is visibly more pronounced for entry within 10 miles ─ indicating that charter entry within 10 
miles may be the most appropriate dependent variable (i.e. entry within 2 miles misses much 
relevant variation and entry within 20 miles captures some irrelevant variation).  
  The regression results in Table 6 tell a similar story as the visuals in Figure 4. Across all 
specifications, there is no relationship between charter entry within 2 miles and teacher salaries. 
In contrast, charter entry within 10 miles is associated with statistically significant increases in 
teacher salaries in all specifications (except the model with trends that has large standard errors). 
The range of estimates indicate that charter entry within 10 miles is associated with between 0.25 
and 0.37 of a percent increase in teacher pay. While the point estimates for the 20 miles sample 
are all positive (consistent with charter entry leading to an increase in teacher salaries) none of 
the coefficients is statistically significant. The fact that salary increases are largest for entry 
within 10 miles is consistent with research on teacher labor markets indicating that they are 
roughly 10 miles on radius (so that 2 miles is too narrow and 20 miles is too broad). 
  If the estimated effects are real, they should be more pronounced in difficult to staff 
schools. For all specifications, the effect of entry within 10 miles is larger in difficult to staff 
schools than on average. While the point estimates for all schools indicate that entry within 10 
miles leads to between 0.25 and 0.37 of a percent increase in teacher pay, for the difficult to staff 
schools the estimates range between 1.2 and 1.3 percent (and are statistically significant). Again, 18 
 
it is entry within 10 miles that has the strongest effect─ suggesting that 10 miles is the most 
appropriate radius. To support the salary results I look at the average number of paying positions 
a teacher holds in the school. If the increase in teacher pay is due, in part, to principals creating 
new positions, one should see an increase in this outcome associated with charter entry. Charter 
entry within 10 miles is associated with a statistically significant 3 percent increase in the mean 
number of paying positions held by teachers both for difficult to staff schools and all schools. 
  Looking to new hires, the middle right panel of Figure 4 shows how the natural log of the 
number of newly hired teachers changes before and after charter entry. For all distances (2, 10, 
20 miles) charter entry is associated with a decline in new teacher hiring. As with the previous 
outcomes, the effect is more visibly pronounced for entry within 10 miles. The regression results 
in Table 6 tell a similar story. While charter entry within 2 miles has little effect on the number 
of new teachers hired, for all models charter entry within 10 miles and 20 miles is associated 
with a reduction in the number of new teachers hired. In the baseline specification charter entry 
within 10 and 20 miles is associated with statistically significant 6.2 and 5.8 percent declines in 
new teacher hiring, respectively. These results are robust to including linear trends for each 
school and dropping data for the years right before charter entry ─ suggestive of a real decline in 
new teacher hiring associated with charter entry within 10 and 20 miles.    
  As before, if the estimated effects are real, one would expect them to be more 
pronounced in difficult to staff schools. For all specifications, the decreases in new hires 
associated with entry within 10 and 20 miles are larger in difficult to staff schools than on 
average. The point estimates from the basic specification indicate that entry within 10, and 20 
miles leads to a 11.6 and 9.1 percent decline in new hires at difficult to staff schools (both 
significant at the 5 percent level). Estimates from the more conservative model (school intercepts 
and trends and interrupted) are almost identical to the more basic model and are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level ─ indicating a real sizable decline in new teacher hiring 
associated with charter entry within 10 and 20 miles at difficult to staff schools. As with the 
other outcomes, the effects are most pronounced for entry within 10 miles. 
IV.3  Effects on Teacher Quality 
  Because charter entry may increase exits and leads to reduced hiring, charter entry might 
also lead to declines in overall teacher quality. Figure 4 plots predicted value-added (for all 
teachers including new hires) in math and reading before and after charter entry. There is a 19 
 
secular decline in teacher value-added for schools facing entry within two miles with no 
discernible shift at year zero. For entry within 10 and 20 miles the outcomes are relatively flat 
with slight declines three years after entry. It is also worth noting that the scale of these figures is 
sufficiently small that any effects are likely to be small. The regression estimates are consistent 
with this. In the regression results presented in Table 7, I focus on entry within 10 miles and 
present the effects on predicted value-added for the different models (on the left of each panel). 
While across all specifications there is a negative relationship between charter entry and 
predicted value-added for both reading and math, none of these effects is economically 
significant. That is, the largest effect for all schools indicates that charter entry within 10 miles is 
associated with less than 0.1 of a percent of standard deviation decline in teacher value-added.  
  There is a decline in teacher quality at difficult to staff schools associated with charter 
entry within 10 miles. As with the other outcomes the marginal effects are larger at these 
difficult to staff schools and the point estimates indicate charter entry reduced mean value-added 
in both subjects by between 0.15 and 0.32 of a percent of a standard deviation at difficult to staff 
schools. While the marginal effect of charter entry is more negative at difficult to staff schools 
for all specifications in both subjects (as with other outcomes) the effects are small.  
  To provide further evidence of a real decline in teacher quality at difficult to staff 
schools, I estimated the marginal effect of charter entry at each level of experience between 0 
and 30. The results are presented in Figure 5. As one can see, charter entry is associated with 
statistically significant increases in the likelihood that a teacher has 0,1, and 2 years of 
experience, but has little effect elsewhere in the experience distribution. This shows that the 
declines in teacher value added at schools that faced charter entry were driven largely by 
declines in teacher experience at the very bottom of the teacher experience distribution.  
  To complement the predicted value-added results, I also estimate effects on estimated 
value-added. As discussed previously, only about a quarter of teachers have estimated value-
added so that these estimates are only suggestive. To deal with missing data I estimate models 
where I impute the 90th and 10th percentiles of the estimated value-added distribution for math 
and reading to obtain upper and lower bound estimates. I present the results in Table 7. These 
results are consistent with those based on predicted value-added. In all models, irrespective of 
the value imputed for missing data, the effects for schools on average are close to zero and some 
estimates are negative while others are positive ─ suggesting little to no effect for the average 20 
 
school. In contrast, at difficult to staff schools, across all models, irrespective of the value 
imputed for missing data, the estimates are negative ─ suggesting a real decline in teacher 
effectiveness at difficult to staff schools. However, as with the predicted value-added the 
marginal effects, while statistically significant, are not economically significant.  
IV.4  Dynamic Effects over Time 
  While the before/after analysis is informative, it might be instructive to see how 
outcomes evolve over time. Figure 6 shows new hires and salary (the two outcomes for which I 
find robust effects) four years before and after charter entry within 10 miles for all schools and 
difficult to staff schools. There is a persistent decline in new hires the year of charter entry for all 
schools and this decline is much larger in difficult to staff schools. On the right I show the effect 
on teacher salaries. There is an upward trend in teacher salaries at difficult to staff schools with 
evidence of an increase after charter entry, while for schools overall there is some evidence of an 
uptick in salaries after charter entry. The estimates for the turnover and value-added are 
sufficiently noisy that I do not present them visually but rely on the regression results. 
  Table 8 shows the estimated dynamic effects of charter entry within 10 miles for exit, 
moving to charter, compensation, new hires, and predicted value-added. I report the coefficients 
on the first and second lag of charter entry for the basic DID models and the conservative 
interrupted DID model with school trends. The point estimates for the conservative specification 
indicate that charter entry is associated with reductions in teacher turnover both overall and at 
difficult to staff schools. The results however are not statistically significant for difficult to staff 
schools. This suggests that in the long run there is no increase in teacher turnover associated with 
charter entry even at difficult to staff schools and that if anything, as a result of demand side 
pressure to retain teachers, teacher turnover may actually decline.  
  The conservative results for hiring and teacher pay suggest real persistent effects. At 
school on average three years after charter entry within 10 miles teacher salaries are 0.35 percent 
higher and the number of new hires is 11.3 percent lower. At difficult to staff schools teacher 
salaries are 3.39 percent higher three years after charter entry within 10 miles and the number of 
new hires is 16.9 percent lower ─ consistent with the large visible effects in Figure 6. The results 
for predicted value added suggest an initial decline in value-added for both math and reading that 
disappears over time such that three years after charter entry there is little to no difference in 
mean teacher value-added even at difficult to staff schools. Results for estimated value-added 21 
 
(not presented here) also suggest no long run effect on teacher effectiveness. 
IV.5  Who Receives Salary Increases? 
  If school principals can identify those teachers that parents demand, and if these are the 
teachers principals chose to retain by giving them increased pay, one would expect that desirable 
teachers would experience the greater salary increases in schools facing charter entry.
19 On the 
other hand, if principals aim to reduce turnover more generally schools may give pay increases to 
all teachers or to those teachers that are most mobile irrespective of their teaching ability. While 
I do not observe a teachers’ desirability to parents, and I do not know what teacher 
characteristics principals consider desirable, I do have measures of teacher quality that arguably 
may be correlated with desirability for parents. I use these measures to see what kinds of teachers 
are systematically more likely to receive salary increases in those schools that face charter 
competition. Specifically, I use teacher level data and regress salary on charter entry and its  
interactions with estimated value-added, predicted value-added, experience, certification status, 
and math and science licensure (while including teacher-by-school fixed effects and year fixed 
effects). In such models (not presented) these interactions do not vary systematically across 
specifications and are not statistically significant— suggesting that those teachers that received 
increases in compensation were not necessarily the teachers I am able to identify as being 
effective or having characteristics that are associated with high value-added. This suggests that 
principals may be choosing to give teachers raises along dimensions other than those identified 
in these data. Given that personality traits and subjective evaluations, which are not necessarily 
correlated with estimated value-added, are predictive of subsequent student achievement 
(Rockoff and Speroni 2010), these findings do not mean that principals do not give raises to 
strong teachers, but that principals are not paying for the set of characteristics I have in the data. 
Moreover, insofar as principals may wish to reduce turnover overall, they may give raises to the 
most mobile teachers irrespective of their effectiveness or qualifications.   
     
V.   Conclusions. 
  Many education reforms such as school vouchers, school choice, and charter schools, are 
predicated, in part, on the notion that increased competitive pressures cause schools to use their 
                                                 
19 In a recent paper Hensvik (2010) uses a reform in Sweden that created regional variation in private school entry 
and find that high ability teachers in math and science receive 4 percent higher wages in the most competitive areas. 22 
 
scarce resources more efficiently. However, some view the education system as operating with 
fixed inputs so that competing schools influence outcomes by redistributing resources within the 
education system and may reduce the resources available to TPSs. Unfortunately, there is no 
consensus on whether school competition helps or hurts students at incumbent schools. 
  I shed light on this issue by investigating one possible mechanism. Specifically, I identify 
the effect of charter school competition on the labor market for TPS teachers. I find that teachers 
moving from TPSs to charter schools have below-average qualifications, but contrary to 
common belief, schools that face increased charter school competition do not experience any 
long-run increases in teacher turnover. This suggests that charter schools merely provide 
alternative employment for less effective teachers who would have left TPS absent charter entry. 
I do however find evidence of competitive supply side pressure such that schools that face 
charter entry experience declines in the number of new teachers hired. I also find that schools 
that face charter entry increase teacher pay ─ indicative of a demand side response to better 
attract and retain teachers. Consistent with these being the results of competitive pressure, I find 
that these effects are more pronounced in difficult to staff schools. I also found evidence of very 
slight declines in teacher quality associated with charter entry at these difficult to staff schools.   
  The results suggest that worries that school competition may lead to the siphoning off of 
the best teachers away from traditional public schools may be unfounded for most schools, but 
may be a cause for concern at difficult to staff schools. Since increased teacher pay must come at 
the expense of other expenditures, the increases in teacher pay (which are non-trivial) imply that 
competition in the labor market for teachers led to reduced expenditures on other potentially 
productive inputs. As such, while charter competition may have a negligible effect (through its 
effect on teacher labor markets) on students at desirable schools, students at difficult to staff 
schools may experience increased unfilled vacancies, reduced expenditure on non-teaching 
inputs, and lower quality instruction. These heterogeneous effects on teacher labor markets 
underscore the importance of thinking about both teacher supply and demand and may help 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Charter Entry and Turnover by Year. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Charter school entrance 
Openings      34 26 23 15  8  5  2  5  2 
Closings      0 1 5 2 5 5 2 1 0 
Total  charters      34 59 77 90 93 93 93 97 99 
Teacher turnover,  all schools 
Number of teachers   71392 73181 75455 77206 79041 80488 82557 84870 86346 
Exiting    13172 14554 14997 16228 16195 16574 16036 16798 19001 
Exiting  to  charter    81  94  89  120 118  94  100 148 155 
Pct.  exiting  to  charter    0.11% 0.13% 0.12% 0.16% 0.15% 0.12% 0.12% 0.17% 0.18% 
Teacher turnover,  schools w/in 2 mi. of a charter 
Number of teachers   1965 4286 5971 7113 7252 7620 7645 8830 8688 
Exiting    394  1025 1332 1717 1721 1747 1780 1884 2174 
Exiting  to  charter    13 17 22 19 23 13 21 35 39 
Pct.  exiting  to  charter    0.66% 0.40% 0.37% 0.27% 0.32% 0.17% 0.27% 0.40% 0.45% 
Teacher turnover, schools 2-10 mi. from a charter 
Number of teachers   12089 18939 24225 27038 30245 32332 33001 33937 37252 
Exiting    2422 3853 4957 5935 6314 6965 6416 6568 8461 
Exiting  to  charter    28 40 33 54 52 56 46 73 88 
Pct.  exiting  to  charter    0.23% 0.21% 0.14% 0.20% 0.17% 0.17% 0.14% 0.22% 0.24% 
Teacher turnover,  schools 10-20 mi. from a charter 
Number of teachers   11150 20648 20961 20838 21064 20428 20543 20363 20415 
Exiting    2043 3934 4153 4115 4123 3751 3790 3538 4193 
Exiting  to  charter    11 17 23 27 29 16 21 26 18 
Pct.  exiting  to  charter    0.10% 0.08% 0.11% 0.13% 0.14% 0.08% 0.10% 0.13% 0.09% 
Charter teachers 
Total    307  566  843  1052 1259 1352 1489 1649 1766 
Previously  in  TPS    171 279 405 494 568 606 614 686 680 
Percent previously in  55.70 49.29 48.04 46.96 45.12 44.82 41.24 41.60 38.5126 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for All Public Schools, Charter Schools, and Schools that Face 
Charter Competition. 
   Schools Near a Charters 
   All Public 2 mi. 2-10 mi. 10-20 mi.  Charter
Urban (Neighborhood) 0.267 0.605 0.353 0.026  0.412
(0.44) (0.49)  (0.48) (0.16) (0.49) 
Urban fringe (Neighborhood)  0.183  0.131  0.246  0.184  0.12 
(0.39) (0.34)  (0.43) (0.39) (0.33) 
Town (Neighborhood)  0.163  0.166  0.099  0.177  0.202 
(0.37) (0.37)  (0.30) (0.38) (0.40) 
Rural (Neighborhood)  0.387  0.099  0.302  0.614  0.267 
(0.49) (0.30)  (0.46) (0.49) (0.44) 
Proportion white (Neighborhood)  0.712  0.638  0.725  0.759  0.657 
(0.21) (0.23)  (0.19) (0.20) (0.24) 
Proportion black (Neighborhood)  0.228  0.297  0.218  0.181  0.276 
(0.19) (0.21)  (0.19) (0.16) (0.22) 
Proportion Hispanic (Neighborhood)  0.044  0.053  0.045  0.04  0.052 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Median income (Neighborhood)  37908  39203  41248  35032  38980 
(10633) (12285)  (11861)  (5986) (12262) 
Proportion black (school)  0.325  0.442  0.314  0.252  0.443 
(0.25) (0.26)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.38) 
Proportion Hispanic (school)  0.042  0.047  0.046  0.042  0.019 
(0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Proportion white (school)  0.602  0.481  0.612  0.671  0.505 
(0.27) (0.26)  (0.25) (0.27) (0.37) 
Proportion free-lunch (school)  0.368  0.406  0.341  0.364  0.133 
(0.21) (0.24)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.26) 
Enrollment 609.068  596.39  649.604  558.525  198.599 
(349) (373)  (362) (279) (161) 
Number of new teachers  7.833 8.836 8.41  6.72 6.065 
(6.17) (6.51)  (6.68) (4.99) (4.68) 
Number of schools   2360 372 1003 534  118
N 22791  3740  9933  5272  803 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations are at the school-by-year level. Near charter consists of schools 


















Table 3: Summary Statistics (Teachers). 
Schools Near a Charter All Movers
All Public 2 miles 2-10 miles 10-20 miles    Exiters Movers CS Movers
NB Certification  0.034  0.041 0.048 0.04 0.021 0.031 0.015
(0.18)  (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12)
Licensed 0.829  0.804 0.827 0.825 0.686 0.804 0.537
(0.38)  (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (0.46) (0.40) (0.50)
Advanced Degree 0.318  0.316 0.313 0.3 0.32 0.283 0.245
(0.47)  (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43)
SATM75 582.436  580.814 587.295 584.202 584.151 582.23 578.857
(59.70)  (67.88) (60.68) (53.77) (62.58) (60.00) (66.65)
Experience 13.494  12.952 12.946 13.447 13.014 10.117 12.768
(10.36)  (10.74) (10.39) (10.49) (12.53) (9.84) (14.20)
Std. License Score  0.033  0.048 0.094 0.039 0.052 0.02 0.029
(0.89)  (0.90) (0.86) (0.85) (0.88) (0.87) (0.95)
Female 0.802  0.823 0.828 0.806 0.788 0.803 0.8
(0.40)  (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40)
Black 0.146  0.236 0.151 0.108 0.167 0.157 0.267
(0.35)  (0.43) (0.36) (0.31) (0.37) (0.36) (0.44)
White 0.835  0.745 0.832 0.869 0.808 0.823 0.701
(0.37)  (0.44) (0.37) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.46)
Predicted Math VA  0.15  0.147 0.151 0.151 0.14 0.143 0.127
(0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Predicted Reading VA  0.066  0.063 0.065 0.066 0.058 0.059 0.048
(0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Estimated Math VA  -0.044  -0.042 -0.04 -0.048 -0.05 -0.05 -0.056
(0.17)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20)
Estimated Reading VA  -0.009  -0.01 -0.008 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.012
(0.07)  (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Exit 0.203  0.237 0.215 0.197 1 1 1
(0.40)  (0.43) (0.41) (0.40) -- -
Move to charter 0.001  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.019 1
(0.04)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.14) -
N 822286  58012 241825 171000     170353 60335 1120
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations are at the teacher by school level. Exiters consists of teachers leaving the NC school system 





Table 4: Comparison of Moving Teachers. 
                     Predicted VA  Estimated VA 
NB Cert.  Lic.  Exp.  Adv. Deg.  SATM75  Praxis  Math VA  Read VA  Math VA  Read VA 
Panel A. Year fixed effects only. 
Leave current school  -0.021**  -0.211**  0.157*  0.022**  3.496**  0.043** -0.015** -0.011** -0.008** -0.002** 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.064] [0.002] [0.326] [0.004]  0.000   0.000   [0.001]  0.000  
Switch schools  0.017**  0.181**  -4.196**  -0.056** -3.001** -0.054** 0.007**  0.003**  0  0 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.091] [0.003] [0.446] [0.006]  0.000   0.000   [0.002]  [0.001] 
Move to charter  -0.022**  -0.184**  -0.416  -0.027+ -5.222*  -0.005 -0.015** -0.009**  -0.007  -0.001 
[0.005] [0.018] [0.413] [0.016] [2.649] [0.036] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.004] 
Charter movers – stayers  -0.025**  -0.215**  -4.454**  -0.062** -4.727*  -0.016  -0.023** -0.018**  -0.015  -0.002 
Std.  Err.  [0.005] [0.018] [0.410] [0.016] [2.644] [0.036] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.004] 
N  737416 714117 737416 720351 672533 675058 340855 340855 340855 340855 
Panel B. School-by-year fixed effects. 
Leave current school  -0.019**  -0.202**  0.437**  0.026**  5.413**  0.055** -0.014** -0.010** -0.009** -0.002** 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.062] [0.002] [0.293] [0.004]  0.000   0.000   [0.001]  0.000  
Switch schools  0.018**  0.173**  -4.220**  -0.047** -0.820* -0.015** 0.007** 0.003**  0.001  0 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.088] [0.003] [0.376] [0.005]  0.000   0.000   [0.002]  [0.001] 
Move to charter  -0.018**  -0.178**  0.007  -0.018 -5.537* -0.001  -0.013** -0.008**  -0.01  0 
[0.005] [0.018] [0.402] [0.016] [2.506] [0.034] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.004] 
Charter movers – stayers  -0.020**  -0.207**  -3.776**  -0.040* -0.944  0.039 -0.019** -0.015**  -0.018+  -0.002 
Std.  Err.  [0.005] [0.017] [0.397] [0.016] [2.492] [0.034] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.004] 
N  737416 714117 737416 720351 672533 675058 340855 340855 340855 340855 
+ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
Notes: Observations are teacher-years. Each column reports results from a separate regression. All models include year fixed effects. Leave current school denotes 
a teacher who exited her school in a given year; Switch schools indicates a teacher who left for any North Carolina public school (including charters); Move to 
charter indicates a teacher who moved to a charter. Regressions are estimated on years 1995-2004. Errors clustered by school. “Charter movers – stayers” 




Table 5: Effect of Charter Entry on Teacher Mobility. 
Dependent Variable: Exit current school  Dependent Variable: Switch to a charter school 
Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects  Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects 

























Nearby -0.00368  0.00559  -0.01132**  -0.01107  -0.00647*  -0.00879 0.00148*  0.00207  0.00122**  0.00195*  0.00092**  0.00194** 
[0.00725] [0.01880]  [0.00329]  [0.01083] [0.00322] [0.00827]  [0.00067] [0.00243] [0.00037] [0.00094] [0.00019] [0.00075] 
Observations  3119  725  14339  2021 20504 2,827  3119  725  14339 2021 20504 2827 
Interrupted with School and Year Fixed Effects  Interrupted with School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby -0.00212  0.00851  -0.01089**  -0.01624  -0.00558  -0.01034  0.00101 -0.00058 0.00124** 0.00144 0.00088** 0.00147+ 
se [0.00760]  [0.02037]  [0.00349]  [0.01192] [0.00344] [0.00884]  [0.00084] [0.00326] [0.00045] [0.00098] [0.00019] [0.00075] 
Obs.  2569  603  11745  1681 16774 2353  2569  603  11745 1681 16774 2353 
Interrupted with Trends and School and Year Fixed Effects  Interrupted with Trends and School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby -0.00049  0.01503  -0.004238  -0.005109  -0.00701  -0.01522 0.001  -0.00046  0.00112+  0.00113  0.00089**  0.00154+ 
se [0.00908]  [0.01986]  [0.00511]  [0.01341] [0.00402] [0.01092]  [0.00093] [0.00305] [0.00063] [0.00127] [0.00032] [0.00093] 
Obs.  2569  603  11745  1681 16774 2353  2569  603  11745 1681 16774 2353 
The indicator variable " Nearby " is equal to 1 if a charter school with at least one overlapping grade is located within the prescribed distance of the TPS and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 














Table 6: Effect of Charter Entry on Teacher Pay and New Hiring. 
Dependent Variable: Log number of new hires  Dependent Variable: Log residual salary 
Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects  Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects 

























Nearby -0.02135  -0.01721  -0.06187**  -0.11604*  -0.05778**  -0.09075* 0.00301  -0.0004  0.00367**  0.01265**  0.00158  0.00312 
[0.03847] [0.08456]  [0.01930]  [0.05517]  [0.01764] [0.04361]  [0.00273]  [0.00779]  [0.00133] [0.00461] [0.00130]  [0.00463] 
Observations 2841  667  13022  1855  18632  2596  3118  725  14337  2021  20502  2827 
Interrupted with School and Year Fixed Effects  Interrupted with School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby -0.02558  -0.01515  -0.06493**  -0.16504**  -0.06600**  -0.11436* 0.00155  -0.00333  0.00277*  0.01344**  0.00167  0.00365 
se [0.03878]  [0.09113]  [0.02059]  [0.05920] [0.01902]  [0.04784]  [0.00303]  [0.00850]  [0.00141] [0.00508] [0.00133]  [0.00481] 
Obs. 2323  553  10608  1551  15046  2144  2323  553  10608  1551  15046  2144 
Interrupted with Trends and School and Year Fixed Effects  Interrupted with Trends and School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby 0.00055  0.01983  -0.08705**  -0.14712**  -0.07725**  -0.09670+ -0.00154  -0.00384  0.00248  0.01326*  0.00196  0.00678 
se [0.04550]  [0.09816]  [0.03021]  [0.05490] [0.02302]  [0.05065]  [0.00316]  [0.00992]  [0.00209] [0.00654] [0.00000]  [0.00521] 
Obs. 2323  553  10608  1551  15046  2144  2323  553  10608  1551  15046  2144 
The indicator variable " Nearby" is equal to 1 if a charter school with at least one overlapping grade is located within the prescribed distance of the TPS and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level.  
Note: Log of new hires is ln(total  new hires + 1). 












Table 7: Effect of Charter Entry Within 10 Miles on Predicted Teacher Value Added (all teachers) and Estimated Value-Added 
(teachers who were in the data before 1998). 
Math  Reading 

























Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects Basic DID with School and Year Fixed Effects
Nearby -0.00068+  -0.00199+  -0.00024  -0.00157  0.00053  -0.00121 -0.00060*  -0.00205*  -0.00028  -0.00153  0.00007  -0.00137 
[0.00037] [0.00112] [0.00030]  [0.00092]+ [0.00038]  [0.00105]  [0.00030]  [0.00080] [0.00023] [0.00064]* [0.00021] [0.00058]* 
Obs. 9667 1541  11229 1735 11229 1735  9667  1541 11229 1735 11229 1735 
Interrupted with School and Year Fixed Effects Interrupted  with School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby -0.00068+  -0.00244*  -0.00055  -0.00272  0.00006  -0.00312  -0.00058+  -0.00235**  -0.00051 -0.00253 -0.00023 -0.00271 
se [0.00040]  [0.00116]  [0.00042]  [0.00119]*  [0.00054]  [0.00141]*  [0.00032]  [0.00084]  [0.00032] [0.00084]** [0.00030] [0.00075]** 
Obs.  7927  1281  9357 1435 9357 1435  7927 1281 9357 1435 9357 1435 
Interrupted with Trends and School and Year Fixed Effects Interrupted  with  Trends  and School and Year Fixed Effects 
Nearby -0.00053  -0.00193+ -0.00085  -0.00326  0.00045  -0.00249  -0.00039  -0.00185*  -0.00031 -0.00262 -0.00012 -0.00527 
se [0.00171]  [0.00111]  [0.00181]  [0.00152]+  [0.001066]  [0.00372] [0.00142]  [0.00079]  [0.00188]  [0.00205]  [0.00829]  [0.00239]+ 
Obs.  7927  1281  9357 1435 9357 1435      7927 1281 9357 1435 9357 1435 
The indicator variable " Nearby" is equal to 1 if a charter school with at least one overlapping grade is located within the prescribed distance of the TPS and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 





Table 8: Effects of Charter Entry Over Time. 
Dynamic Effects of Charter entry within 10 miles  
School and Year FX 
School and Year FX with 
trends Interrupted  School and Year FX 
School and Year FX 

















Exit  Move to Charter 
Nearby -0.00588  0.00064  -0.00975  -0.01424  0.00172**  0.00191  0.00154**  0.00150 
[0.00401] [0.01315] [0.00569] [0.01426]  [0.00055] [0.00119] [0.00058] [0.00138] 
       Lag  -0.00792+  -0.01435  -0.01461 0.00301  -0.00076 0.00066  -0.00104  -0.00012 
[0.00447] [0.01458] [0.01012] [0.03417]  [0.00057] [0.00143] [0.00060] [0.00145] 
       Second  -0.00456 -0.02436* -0.00298  -0.01325  -0.00054+ -0.00164 -0.00105*  -0.00213* 
[0.00385] [0.01221] [0.00899] [0.02878]  [0.00028] [0.00116] [0.00046] [0.00098] 
Observations  13860 2021 11604 1681  13860 2021  11604  1681 
Effect after 3  -0.0184** -0.0381*  -0.02734**  -0.02448  0.00042 0.00093  -0.00055  -0.00075 
se.  [0.00446] [0.0160] [0.00622]  [0.01962] [0.00028]  [0.0011]  [0.00622]  [0.00143] 
Log of new hires  Log of residual salary 
Nearby -0.05306*  -0.10640+  -0.08482**  -0.14345**  0.00206  0.00981+  0.00137  0.01104 
[0.02136] [0.05834] [0.02360] [0.05969]  [0.00145] [0.00537] [0.00203] [0.00672] 
       Lag  -0.00936  0.02039  -0.0205  0.00853  0.00219  0.0025  0.00566  0.00403 
[0.02165] [0.06336] [0.04396] [0.10462]  [0.00150] [0.00505] [0.00344] [0.01397] 
       Second  -0.02227 -0.10658+ -0.00855  -0.03436  -0.00098 0.00874* -0.00354 0.01884 
[0.02147] [0.05712] [0.04337] [0.09916]  [0.00145] [0.00404] [0.00446] [0.01195] 
Observations  12601 1855 10481 1551  12601 1855  10481  1551 
Effect after 3  -0.0847**  -0.193**  -0.11387**  -0.16928**  0.00327+ 0.02105** 0.00349+ 0.03391** 
se.  [0.0274] [0.0781] [0.0355] [0.0623]  [0.00188] [0.00593] [0.00211] [0.00954] 
Predicted Value Added Reading  Predicted Value Added Math 
Nearby  -0.00080**  -0.00206** -0.0005 -0.00203** -0.00100**  -0.00191  -0.00069  -0.00231* 
[0.00030] [0.00079] [0.00040] [0.00074]  [0.00037] [0.00116] [0.00052] [0.00104] 
       Lag  0.00026  -0.00015  0.00084  0.00104  0.00046  -0.00049  0.0014  0.00246 
[0.00027] [0.00097] [0.00065] [0.00211]  [0.00039] [0.00153] [0.00100] [0.00283] 
       Second  -0.00005 0.00057 -0.00022 0.00006  -0.00007 0.00119 -0.00054  -0.00024 
[0.00031] [0.00093] [0.00052] [0.00210]  [0.00043] [0.00133] [0.00106] [0.00281] 
Observations  9403 1541 7845 1281  9403 1541  7845  1281 
Effect after 3  -0.000593 -0.00163  0.00012  -0.00093  -0.00061 -0.00120 0.00017 -0.00009 
se.  [0.00045] [0.00124] [0.00069] [0.00080]  [0.00059] [0.00164] [0.0068] [0.00121] 
The indicator variable " Nearby " is equal to 1 if a charter school with at least one overlapping grade is located within the 
prescribed distance of the TPS and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 











Figure 2: Charter Entry and Teacher at Traditional Public Schools with Both a Labor Supply 
and a Labor Demand Response. 
Effect of Charter Entry Within Teacher Supply Area: By Labor Demand Regime 
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Figure 3: Number of Nearby Charter Schools Conditional on Charter Entry. 




























0 1 2 3 4
Number of charters w/in 2 miles





























Number of charters w/in 10 miles




























0 5 10 15 20
Number of charters w/in 20 miles35 
 
 





















































-4 -2 0 2 4
year











-4 -2 0 2 4
year











-4 -2 0 2 4
year
Predicted Value Added Math
(grey) - 2 Miles - - - 10 Miles  •••• 20 Miles36 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of charter entry within 10 miles on the distribution of teacher experience at 
difficult to staff schools. 
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Appendix:  
Appendix Table 1: Selected Teacher Survey Results 
   Public  Charter 
Teachers have reasonable student loads.  3.186  4.373 
(1.50) (1.51) 
Leadership tries to address concerns about time.  3.692  4.012 
(1.49) (1.50) 
Teachers have a range of support personnel.  3.689  3.245 
(1.40) (1.55) 
Principal is a strong, supportive leader.  4.359  4.415 
(1.59) (1.58) 
Administrators give priority to supporting teachers.  3.926  4.071 
(1.42) (1.45) 
New teachers have effective mentors.  4.261  3.504 
(1.40) (1.68) 
Teachers are centrally involved in decision-making.  3.591  4.098 
(1.47) (1.55) 
Teachers are recognized as educational experts.  3.918  4.555 
(1.50) (1.42) 
There is an atmosphere of mutual respect at school.  3.869  4.289 
(1.46) (1.50) 
Leadership tries to provide quality professional development.  4.214  4.508 
(1.38) (1.43) 
Observations 31822  245 
This presents the means of survey data for charter teachers and non-charter school teachers about their 
impressions of their school work environment from the Working Conditions Survey administered by the 
North Carolina Professional Teaching Standards Commission in 2002. A score of 0 means highly 
disagree while a score of 5 means highly agree. Since charter school teachers may differ from non-














Appendix Note 1:  Empirical Bayes Estimates: While teacher effects that come directly from [1] 
should yield consistent estimates of teacher value added, a more efficient estimate is the 
Empirical Bayes (EB) estimate that shrinks noisy value added estimates towards the mean of the 
value added distribution (in this case zero). Where  j u is random estimation error  ˆjjj u     , 
and  (0, ( )) j NV a r    , so that the total variance of the estimated effects is 
ˆ () ( ) () jj Var Var Var u    . With estimation error 
22 2 ˆˆ [|]( / ( ) )
j j ju j E         . The empirical 
analog of this conditional expectation is an EB estimate. I follow Kane and Staiger (2008) to 
compute the EB estimates. This approach accounts for the fact that (1) teachers with larger 
classes will tend to have more precise estimates and (2) there are classroom level disturbances so 
that teachers with multiple classrooms will have more precise value added estimates. To simplify 
notation, I subsume all observed covariates into a single variable  jt X  and drop the grade 
subscript g to re-write equation [3] as [A1] below. 
1 ijt ijt jt j jt ijt AA X             [ A 1 ]  
In [A1], the total error term is  ijt j jt ijt z   . Since the student error component is equal to 
zero in expectation, the mean residual for classroom jt,  jt j jt c     , contains the teacher effect 
and the idiosyncratic classroom error. Since classroom errors are random, I use the covariance 
between mean residuals of adjacent classrooms for the same teacher
2
1 ˆ cov( , ) jt jt cc     as an 
estimate of the variance of true teacher quality. I use the variance of the classroom demeaned 
residuals as an estimate of 
2 ˆ  . Since the variance of the residuals is equal to the sum of the 
variances of the true teacher effect, the classroom effect, and the student error, I compute the 
classroom error variance 
2
  by subtracting 
2
  and 
2
  from the total variance of the residuals.  
For each teacher, I compute a weighted average of their mean classroom residuals, where 
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   .     [ A 2 ]  
Where  jt N  is the number of students in classroom jt, and  j T is the total number of classrooms for 
teacher  j. To obtain an EB estimate for each teacher, I multiply the weighted average of 
classroom residuals  j   by an estimate of its reliability. Specifically, I compute 
222 ˆˆ ˆ /( )
j
EB
jj u               [ A 3 ]  
where   
1
22 2




uj t t N   

    is the estimation variance of the raw value added 
estimate. The shrinkage factor 
222 ˆˆ /( )
j u     is the ratio of signal variance to total variance and 
is a measure of how reliable an estimate  j   is for  j  .  
 